The Curry-Howard Correspondence has a long history, and still is a topic of active research. Though there are extensive investigations into the subject, there doesn't seem to be a definitive formulation of this result in the level of generality that it deserves. In the current work, we introduce the formalism of p-institutions that could unify previous aproaches. We restate the tradicional correspondence between typed λ-calculi and propositional logics inside this formalism, and indicate possible directions in which it could foster new and more structured generalizations.
1 Some things to note This work is the conclusion of two years of research, the first of them informal, and the second regularly enrolled in the course MAT0148 Introdução ao Trabalho Científico. As a final product, it's not a complete picture of the process that gave its origin. During that time, many subjects were discussed that didn't make their way into this pages -be it for time, be it for a simple thematic inadequacy. Some of these would-be-results are mentioned along the way, and some have lost themselves to time or memory -maybe to br remembered later on.
Our investigations had simple motivations: clarity. The Curry-Howard Correspondence, our object of study, traces its origin to the early twentieth-century, with the invention of the λ-calculus, and is an active research subject even today. Being a correspondence between two logical systems, there is always the pursuit, inherent to mathematical research, to extend its limits to more and more general classes. There are also situations, such as in the foudational tome Univalent Foundations Program [2013] , in whose foundational theoretical and methodological core is ingrained the Curry-Howard Correspondence. This idea is also known as the paradigm of propositions-as-types.
It's enough to say that the Curry-Howard Correspondence is as much inspiring as it is mysterious. And it's not for nothing that it doesn't have an stablished formalization. There are diverse formalisms and extensions built atop it, as the Lambda Cube [see Barendregt, 1991] , or the formalism of Lambek and Scott [1988] . Each of them, however, has its compromises and imparsimonies 1 .
So we decided to carve a sliver into this problem ourselves, and seek our own understanding of what is this result. And of course, what we found is a reflection of our own methodological aproach -a personal expression. Nonetheless, we oriented ourselves with the goal of distiling the essence of the problem.
What we are talking about
The Curry-Howard Correspondence is an observation on the relation between two deductive systems: the intuitionistic propositional logic and the simply typed lambda calculus.
The propositional logic is familiar to any mathematician. It's the logic that deals, evidently, with propositions -these formal objects that represent state-ments and "it is raining and it is cold", or "if it is raining them i'll take my umbrella". They are representad symbolically by abstracting details off the non-propositional parts with variables A, B, P , Q, etc.
From an algebraic point of view, such logics are algebras with operations such as the conjunction, disjunction, implication, etc.
From a logical point of view, there are multiple formalisms for such systems, but we'll use the one in which proofs look like trees
The λ-calculus, on the other hand, has its origin in Computer Science, offering (in its untyped version) an alternative to Turing Machines.
The terms of the λ-calculus follow a specific syntax.
term " V | pterm termq | λV term which represent, respectively, variables, the application of functions, and the construction of functions. For example, the constant function has the form λxλy . x which takes and argument x and returns a function that, upon taking any other argument y, always returns x.
The crucial observation, here, is that we can make this theory more wellbehaved by attributing to this terms types -syntactical classes that dictate how they should interact. We tart with a class of basic types denoted A, B, P , Q, etc.
If we have two types A and B, we may construct the new type A Ñ B, the type of functions between A and B. Given a variable x of type A and a term t (possibly containing x) of type B, we may form the term λx . t of type A Ñ B.
If we have both f : A Ñ B and t : A (the colon is read as "has the type"), we may form pf tq : B.
You might already begin to see a relation between both systems. . . something we might call a correspondence. Indeed, the Curry-Howard Correspondence is an observation on some kind of interdeductibility bertween the Simply-Typed λ-calculus and the Intuitionistic Propositional Logic. The rules presented above can be seen as deduction rules, and, just like that, we see ourselves writing
This can be very well summarized in a theorem, paraphrasing Sorensen and Urzyczyn [2006] , Theorem. It is true that
in the Propositional Logic (whereΓ is Γ without variables).
2. If ∆ $ A true is deductible in the Propositional Logic, then Γ $ t : A is deductible in the λ-calculus for some term t and Γ havingΓ " ∆.
The details of this theorem are the subject of the present work.
Notes on methodology
Some methodological particularities are to be mentioned, to the cost of some readers being spooked upon contact with the rest of the text. If you, the reader, have skimmed the rest of these pages, no doubt you will have noticed the presence of code listings. That's explained by two facts:
1. Our base theory is not ZFC, as much as it is not at all classic. We're working informally in the Martin-Löf Type Theory, that is intuitionistic. Every argument (though there are not many) are constructivist in nature, and all definitions are focused in pinning down structure, not concepts.
2. Formally, our definitions and theorems are stated in the type-theory which forms the basis of Idris. It is also derived from the Martin-Löf Type Theory. There's comprehensive material on that programming language online, besides the book by Brady [2017] . Idris is a propgramming language, focused on software development, but it serves just as well as a formal theorem-proving enviroment.
Some statements come also in an Idris version -checked by its compiler -, though we may have ommited some others in the name of brevity.
Take a map
This text is structured in the following way.
• Section 2 talks about our formalism, and what is the reasoning behind its definition. It seeks to answer the question, as the title indicates, what is a logic? Particullarly, what is a formulation of the ideia of one logic that is succeptible to the Curry-Howard Correspondence.
• Section 3 uses the formalism developed in 2 and applies it into formalizing the theorem.
• Section 4 discusses possible further developments.
2 What is a logic?
As for the literature
The natural starting point for a definitional question like the one we ask ("what is the Curry-Howard Correspondence?") is bibliographic revision. We hoped to find, among the miriad stablished definitions of what might a logic be, one that fit our bill.
The study of logic -which, despite the wide-spread usage of the word, isn't a homogeneous field -is almost as old as western thought. Still, there doesn't seem to be any sort of consensus on its object of study. There isn't a single definition of the word "logic" [see Hofweber, 2018, 2] .
Nonetheless, there are several definitions with varying levels of generality. Starting with the concept of Tarski consequence operators [Los and Suszko, 1958] , layed out as a way to define logics by their notions of deductibility, abstracted away from the details of the particular deductions. They stand out for being a "universal" formulation: a logic, so to speak, is determined by a set of data (a set of formulas and an operator) satisfying certain properties (like finitariety, monotonicity, reflexivity, etc) -not unlike the way many structures are defined by their universal properties in Category Theory, only later for examples to be constructed.
Another idea, more categoriacal in nature, and originated in other contexts, is that of institutions -or, for our proof-theoretical purposes, their cousings the π-institutions (the first occurence of the subject can be found in Fiadeiro and Sernadas [1988] ). A π-institution is defined by a sequence of data: It's worth noting that a π-institution morphism is given by a functor between the signature categories and a natural transformation between the sentence functors (mediated by the morphism one), again satisfing some notion of coherence. Coloquially, the functor provides a reinterpretation of conectives, and the natural transformation a "change in the form" of the sentences.
These structures can be seen as a categorical reinterpretation of Tarski Operators. Everything that applies to these applies point-wise to those, plus the additional structure of the "translations" given by the signature morphisms. A stardard reference on the subject of institutions, where one can get a better understanding of the workings of this sort of machinery, is Diaconescu [2008] .
There are even more categorical aproaches to general definitions of logics. We could mention, for example, Lambek and Scott [1988] 's interpretation of higher order logics as categories closed under certain operations. Particularly, the idea that intuitionistic propositional logics correspond to cartesian-closed categories -and that lambda-terms are arrows in that category.
Finally, the least standard reference we'll considere comes from the famous 2 n-categorical encyclopedia nLab [nLab authors, 2019]. A deductive system, according to that definition, is "a collection of judgements" together with a "collection of steps", which consist in a list of judgements 3 -its hypothesis -and another judgement -its conclusion.
.
These "steps", obviously, can be composed to form deductions. Actually, deductions are freely generated from their composition.
In short, we consider the following definitions and interpretations:
Tarski The idea of logic as a "universal" formulation: an abstract structure satisfying some properties.
Institutions Logics form a category with their translations.
Lambek Logics are categories themselves, or categories with additional structure.
Deductive systems Deduction from proof. A logical system is determined by how you are allowed to construct arguments. A logical step is an abstract entity that allows you to jump from hypothesis to a conclusion.
With the goal of defining a class of systems subject to a theorem like Curry-Howard, we start exploring deductive systems. Let us keep in mind, though, that eventually we'd like to formalize the theorem between the already mentioned systems, with the possibility of extensions.
Deductive Systems
The fundamental idea of deductive systems is that deductions are governed by rules -objects that authorize transitions between judgements. These rules, or steps, then, act over some kind of judgements J : Type. There are pairs, so to speak, that indicate when a conclusion J : J can be made from hypothesis J 1 ,¨¨¨, J n´1 : J . Formally, Definition 1 (Step/Inference). An inference over a base type J : Type is a triple containing the indices of its hypothesis 4 , the hypothesis themselves, and a conclusion. conclusion : j A deductive system is determined not only from its judgements or logical steps, but also by which steps ever are authorized. We call that extra structure a ruleset.
Definition 2 (Ruleset). A ruleset is an indexed family of inferences. Now, we define what we actually want to achieve with deductive systems. In a way, we have defined up to here the signature of a deductive system, but not its deductions. So for every judgement, we attribute it the type of its proofs.
idr/DeductiveSystems/DeductiveSystems.idr 36 data Deduction : Ruleset l j -> j -> Type where Constructing a proof, given a type for the judgements and a ruleset over it, involves given a step (that's in the ruleset) and proofs of its hypothesis. That way, we obtain a proof of its conclusion.
That is, proofs are build inductively, or freely, from the application of the following function. Deduction r (conclusion (r i)) --we get a proof of the conclusion ãÑ
Relations
We may test definitions by comparing them to similar, better stablished ones.
As we work with deductive systems, inspired in an entry to a non-standard encyclopedia, we might ask ourselfs: how does this compare to other formalisms we've mentioned? Let's start with Tarski operators -or their equivalent counterparts, deductive relations. Right off the bat we observe that deductive systems, thus abstractly defined, is not a theory of inference, just as much as it is a theory of proofs -a prooftheory. After all, we've defined a judgement's type of proofs, with no space for hypothesis. To this purpose, we may refine the type of judgements. Instead of a generic type, we consider a type of hypothetical judgements over a base type.
Definition 3 (Inferência). A inference over a type of judgements J is an object of the form
where J i , J : J . We denote the type of these objects as Inference J .
Definition 4. A hypothetical ruleset over a type J is a ruleset over Inference J .
It's now evident the translation we seek: a hypothetical deductive system determines a deductive relation, where we say that a certain inference is valid under that relation if there's proof of it. That is, we say Γ ą J if there's proof of Γ $ J 5 .
But alas, here we find a problem. On the one hand, the definition of an inference construes its hypothesis as a finite list of judgements, which is usual and sometimes necessary 6 in various type theories. On the other hand, deductive relations are most commonly instituted between subsets of the type of judgements 5. We denote deductive relations by ą and hypothetical judgements by $, to avoid misunderstandings. and judgements themselves.
So how might we correct such disparity? We could hope to define translations from one kind of judgement to the other. As the base type is the same, we've only been left with transforming: literally changing the form of one kind of judgement into the other. Here we might notice Γ $ J ∆ ą J that the relevant difference is just in the form of the hypothesis: finite lists on the left, and subsets on the right. That's the transformation we want to achieve.
The seemingly most natural way to do it is to take the range of a list to form a set, and to take finite lists from a set the other way around. That is, denoting by "Γ $ J" the phrase "there's proof ρ :
Where a ∆-sequence is a finite list with its range a subset of ∆. The deductive system $ ą determined by a deductive relation ą is given by Γ $ J if ImpΓq ą J A keen reader might have noticed that these definitions seem to define some kind of adjection between the classes of deductive systems and relations. Indeed,
A relation is finitary if from an inference we may find another that stands between a finite subset of the original hypothesis and the same conclusion. A system is monotonic if we may add hypothesis whilst preserving the inference.
Proof. Starting with the first one,
In dependent type theories, contexts (hypothesis) must be ordered because later types might depend on variables declared to be of earlier ones. Finiteness is a common property, as we often construct proofs as necessarily finite objects.
But Γ is a Im Γ-sequence and Γ $ J. For the later two implications,
But the image of a ∆-sequence is exactly a finite subset of ∆. So we conclude that
We've stumbled upon a concept that's reminicent of a morphism between these two logical systems. But instead of exchanging signatures, as is normally the case, we've transformed them -literally, changed their form.
That's familiar enough: it's analogous to a π-institution morphism. Though we've kept fixed a signature, the change-in-form behaves as some kind of natural transformation between the "sentence functors" of the deductive systems and relations.
A troubling inconsistency of this interpretation, however, is the fact that deductive systems aren't as "abstract" as deductive relations. We've defined them explicitly, demanding data that informs us exactly how to construct proofs. They talk about proof, not provability.
This can, however, be fixed.
p-institutions
We start our definitive formalization with the notion of a predicate, the "abstract" version of a deductive system.
Definition 6 (Predicate). A predicate over a type is just an indexed family over it. Under the propositions-as-types interpretation -which, besides being formalized by us provides us with a foundational principle in our methodology -, they may be understood as a function that associates to every element of a base type a propositionergo, a predicate.
In another, complimentary reading, a predicate pairs every inhabitant of its universe of discourse with the type of its proofs. So that's the proofful interpretation.
idr/Predicates/Predicates.idr We define also an appropriate notion of morphism between these objects:
Definition 7 (Predicate Morphism). A predicate morphism is a function between base types that preserves provability.
In more detail, a morphism is a function that lifts to the type of proofs. i.e., given predicates π : a Ñ U and τ : b Ñ U, a morphism is a function f : a Ñ b such that, for every j : a, there's a function ε j : πpjq Ñ τ pf pjqq. Definition 9 (p-Institution Morphism). A p-institution morhpism between pSig, Sen, πq and pSig 1 , Sen 1 , π 1 q is determined by a functor F : Sig Ñ Sig 1 and a natural transformation µ : Sen Ñ Sen 1˝F such that ź a:Sig ź j:Sen a π j ÝÑ π 1 pµ jq
Deductive systems as p-institutions
We've defined p-institutions in order to have an abstract notion of deductive systems. A particular deductive system correspondes to a predicate, but a pinstitution is a structured collection of predicates. So, in order to see deductive systems as p-institutions, we have to consider structure collections of them. Particularly, a kind of indexed family. We start with a category Sig and a functor Sen : Sig Ñ Type. But now, instead of attributing a predicate to every signature, we attribute a ruleset. For every Σ : Sig we attribute an indexing family l Σ : Type and a ruleset R Σ : Ruleset l Σ pSen Σq. Besides, for every arrow f : Σ Ñ Σ 1 a ruleset morphism R f : R Σ Ñ R 1 Σ . Given the data pSig, Sen, l, Rq we may define the p-institution given by pSig, Sen, πq where π a J " Deduction R a J as expected 7 .
3 What is the Curry-Howard Correspondence?
Propositional Logic
The tradicional Curry-Howard Theorem, as presented in Sorensen and Urzyczyn [2006] , is a specfic case on a distinguished result about a particular morphism between two p-institutions. One of them, which we explore first, it that of the so called propositional logics.
We start, as usual, with signatures.
Definition 10 (Propositional Signature). A propositional signature is determined by an indexed family of arities, rules and a type for variables. That is, a tuple pC, #, R, H, Vq where
• C : Type, is a type whose inhabitants are called connectives.
• # : C Ñ N, an arity function.
• For connective c : C, a family H c " th r u r:Rpcq (where f unction R CType) of headers: lists containing the elements true or prop, whose lenght is the connectives arity # c.
• A type V : Type for variables.
7. It's interesting to consider that a pair pSig, Senq might admit several notions of provability, made concrete in the form of several rulesets over it. Considering as arrows between these pairs functors and natural transformations as previously defined, could wi set up a π or p-institution of the "deductive structures over pSig, Senq? We leave you with that. 
var : Type
A signature, in the context of anything-institutions, can be understood as the most concise data that distinguishes the different logics inside the same institution-like structure. In the case of propositional logics, that means their connectives, arities (which, by themselves, already determine all propositions) besides the rules governing them (which determine the notion of proof).
Definition 11 (Propositional Signature Morphism). A propositional signature morphism is determined by a function between the connectives that preserves arity and that's lifted to a function between rules, besides a separate function between variables.
That is, given signatures pC, #, R, H, Vq and pC 1 , # 1 , R 1 , H 1 , V 1 q, a function f : C Ñ C 1 such that @c P C . # c " # 1 f pcq, and functions g c : Rpcq Ñ R 1 pf pcqq and h : V Ñ V 1 .
Remark. The given definition for morphisms it, for the most part, too strict. It is, however, simpler than the alternatives -and, for our purposes, it doesn't make any difference. We adopt it in the name of simplicity.
Definition 12 (Propositions over a signature). The propositions over a signature are build inductively:
• A variable is a proposition, and
• A connective with arity n applied to n propositions is a proposition. Structural For every context Γ, proposition P and judgement J, allow it to be that
Syntactical Every connective c : C has a formation rule: given propositions P 0 ,¨¨¨, P # c and context Γ,
Introduction For every connective c : C and rule r : Rpcq, for propositions P 0 ,¨¨¨, P # c and context Γ,
Elimination For every connective c, an elimination rule
for context Γ, propositions P 0 ,¨¨¨, P # c and proposition C. The propositions P ri are chosen among the P j , where r varies over the rules and i over r's hypothesis that have the adjective true.
Let's look at an example: suppose a signature has among its connectives a _ : C, whose arity is # _ " 2, whose rules are Left : R _ e Right : R _ , and headers H c pLeftq " rtrue, props H c pRightq " rprop, trues So we have the following rules
Note that despite not expressing it explicitly, we have specified the index besides the rules themselves. The index of a rule consists on the name Form c , Intro r c , etc, besides the data introduced as in "for every context Γ and propositions [. . .] ". The rules themselves are given by their diagramatical representations.
That said, we can take a look at a sample demonstration. We leave it as an exercise to fill-in the names of the rules, complete the missing parts or even redoing the proof-tree without looking at it.
Note, finally, how the proof-tree has certain "transition" nodes between judgements of type true and of type prop. When does that transition happen? * * * Formally, the rules' indices form an inductive type, as follows (just the introduction and elimination cases). The function filterWith takes from the vector ps those elements which are paired with elements of the header rule s c r that satisfy the boolean predicate IsIsTrue -those propositions that, for that header, need to be true in the application of that rule -, e puts them together in a list that's appended to the context. The morphisms are extended in the obvious way.
Judgements The judgements of the λ-calculus over Σ " pC, #, R, H, Vq are of the form v 0 : P 0 ,¨¨¨, v n´1 : P n´1 $ J
where v i : V tm , P i are propositions over Σ and J has one of the forms
where P is a proposition and t is a term over Σ:
• Every individual variable is a term.
• For every connective c : C, and every rule r : R, there's a term constructor λ r c that takes as many terms as there are hypothesis of the form t : A; and returns a term.
• For every connective c : C, there's an eliminator ε c that takes, for every rule r : R, as many variables as there are hypothesis of the form t : ϕ; and a term, and teruns a term. e.g.,
In the example, the constructors are usually denoted
Note that the instances of the symbols In L and In R in the eliminator are simply asthetic -not really applications of the constructors.
Rules Axiom For every propositional variable p : V ty and context Γ, an axiom Γ $ p type VarpΓ, pq
Structural For every context Γ, variable x that does not occur in Γ, proposition P and judgement J,
Syntactical For every connective c : C, context Γ, proposition P i , 0 ď i ă # c,
Introduction For every connective c : C and rule r : Rpcq, for propositions P 0 ,¨¨¨, P # c and as many terms t i as there are entries in r's header with the value true,
Elimination For every connective c, an elimination rule Γ $ p : cpP 0 ,¨¨¨, P # c q Γ, x r11 : P r11 ,¨¨¨, x r1k1 : P r1k1 $ t 1 : C¨¨Γ , x r l 1 : P r l 1 ,¨¨¨, x r1k1 : P r l k l $ t l : C Γ $ ε c px r11 ,¨¨¨, x r1k1 , t 1 ,¨¨¨, t l q still standing the same remarks as for the Propositional Logic eliminators 8 .
The traditional correspondece, revisited
Having define both systems -the propositional logic pSig P , Sen P , π P q and the λcalculus pSig λ , Sen λ , π λ q -, we strive to relate them. There's an obvious way: a "forgetful" morphism. The judgements in the λ-calculus carry more information, in some sense, than those of Propositional Logic. We may, then, discard that information.
We define a morphism T λÑP " pT, α, βq between the p-institutions defined from both parametrized deductive systems.
• The functor between signature-categories is a forgetful one.
T : pC, #, R, H, V ty , V tm q Þ ÝÑ pC, #, R, H, V ty q • The natural transformation, for its part, is given by the following rules:
for Σ : Sig, we define α Σ : Sen P Σ Ñ Sen λ T pΣq
x 0 : P 0 ,¨¨¨, x n´1 : P n´1 $ t : P Þ ÝÑ P 0 ,¨¨¨, P n´1 $ P true
x 0 : P 0 ,¨¨¨, x n´1 : P n´1 $ P type Þ ÝÑ P 0 ,¨¨¨, P n´1 $ P prop
• The proof-translation β is given rule-by-ryle: for Σ : Sig and ϕ : Sen P Σ,
Writing ¨ for β Σ,ϕ p¨q, 8. Yes, the syntax seems dense -because it is. These rules work much better in syntaxes as that of Idris, in which the use of arbitrary functions substitues the conventions of mathematical writing.
Inside our formalism, with all such preliminaries, the Curry-Howard Correspondence takes its form as a short and elegant statement.
Theorem 1 (Powered-Up Curry-Howard). T λÑP is surjective in the space of all proofs.
In details, given, in the propositional logic,
• a signature Σ P : Sig P ,
• a judgement J P : Sen P Σ P , and
• a proof ρ P : π P Σ J, there exists, in the λ-calculus,
• a signature Σ λ : Sig λ ,
• a judgement J λ : Sen λ Σ Σ λ , and • a proof ρ λ : π λ Σ J, such that
Proof. Take pΣ, J, ρ in the space-of-proofs in the prpositional logic, where Σ " pC, #, R, H, V, Nq and J " P 0 ,¨¨¨, P n´1 $ P true{prop. There are four steps for our demonstration: to build a signature, to build a judgement over that a signature, to prove it and show that all that data hits our target under T λÑ prop .
The signature is rather trivial: just add to Σ a sufficient type for variables, like Ni.e., pC, #, R, H, V, Nq.
The new judgement is a bit trickier, but it's nothing more than an extension of the proof given by Sorensen and Urzyczyn [2006] . We construct, from the proof ρ, a term t over distinct variables x 0 ,¨¨¨, x n´1 9 .
9. In the demonstration, "it is convenient to choose Γ " tpxϕ : ϕq | ϕ P ∆u, where xϕ are distinct variables" [Sorensen and Urzyczyn, 2006, p. 78 ].
x 0 : P 0 ,¨¨¨, x n´1 : P n´1 $ t : P or simply to consider x 0 : P 0 ,¨¨¨, x n´1 : P n´1 $ P type depending on the adjective. The term t is built by induction in ρ, together with the proof of its typing. We omit the later for simplicity, as it's just a matter of adding a superscript λ to the proofs. Anyway, it must be the case that ρ is of one of the forms Var p In this case, J, must be $ p type, in which case there's nothing to construct.
SelfpDq J must be Γ, J $ J, in which case we choose as a term the variable that acompanies J.
WeakpD, D 1 q J is anything, with one additional hypothesis in the context. We apply this translation recursively in the proof of the hypothesis that carries J and use that result.
Form c pD 0 ,¨¨¨, D # c q J must be of the form Γ $ cp¨¨¨q prop, in which case there's no term to build.
Intro r c pD 0 ,¨¨¨, D # c q J must be Γ $ CpP i q true, with hypothesis of the form Γ $ P i true or Γ $ P i prop. To the ones that carry the adjective true, we recursively apply this procedure and obtain terms t i , which we use to build the term λ r c pt i . Elim c pD, D r0 ,¨¨¨, D r l q J must be of the form Γ $ C true with hypothesis Γ $ cpP i q true and Γ, P rj i $ C true, in which case we recursively apply this procedure on the hypothesis and obtain terms c j (besides the variables x rj i ), and construct the term εpc j , x rj i q.
If we deonte by termpDq the term associated with the deduction D (if it exists), and by deductionpDq the proof of its typing in the λ-calculus, the judgements of the λ-calculus will be x 0 : P 0 ,¨¨¨, x n´1 : P n´1 $ termpρq : P x 0 : P 0 ,¨¨¨, x n´1 : P n´1 $ P type with the associated proofs deductionpρq. Finally, we obtain the triple pΣ λ , J λ , ρ λ q. Verifying that their image is what it's supposed to be is as simple as a matter of calculations -which , nonetheless should be intuitive: as far as the signatures and judgements go, it's evident; as for the deductions, it's as troublesome as observing that the translations works rule-by-rule -and, afterall, we've defined ρ λ so that it would work with that translation.
Sorensen and Urzyczyn [2006]'s result is then a corollary
Corollary 1 (Curry-Howard). Ipsis literis,
2. If ∆ $ ϕ em IPCpÑq, then Γ $ M : ϕ in λ Ñ , for some M and some Γ with rgpΓq " ∆.
in our formalism: in the standard signature Σ P of the implicational propositional logic and Σ λ of the λ-calculus, 1. If J : Sen λ Σ λ has a proof, then α Σ λ pJq has a proof, and 2. If J : Sen P Σ P has a proof, then there is J 1 : Sen λ Σ λ that has a proof and α Σ λ pJ 1 q " J.
Proof. If there is a proof of a judgement J in the λ-calculus in the tradional signature Σ λ , there is proof of α Σ λ in the intuitionistic propositional logic, as T λÑP is a morphism. The other way, consider J a judgement of the intuitionistic propositional logic in the standard signature Σ P , with a proof ρ : π P Σ J. Then there is a judgement J 1 : Sen λ Σ λ and proof ρ 1 : π λ Σ λ J 1 with image J and ρ under T λÑP . In particular, α Σ λ J 1 " J.
Finally, it's worth noting the following: one particular troublesome point about the Curry-Howard Correspondence was that, strangely, the literature didn't seem to agree if the theorem deserved the title of an isomorphism or not. The title of Sorensen and Urzyczyn [2006] 's is Lectures on the Curry-Howard Isomorphism, even though they themselves note that [. . .] the reader may find [the theorem as stated] a little unsatisfactory. If we talk about an "isomorphism" then perhaps the statement of the proposition should have the form of an equivalence? The concluding sentence [-that "in particular an implicational formula is an intuitionistic theorem if and only if it is an inhabited type -] is indeed of this form, but it only holds on a fairly high level: We must abstract from the proofs and only ask about conclusions. (Or, equivalently, we abstract from terms and only ask which types are non-empty.) To support the idea of an "isomorphism," we would certainly prefer an exact, bijective correspondence between proofs and terms.
Unfortunately, we cannot improve [the statement] in this respect, at least not for free. While it is correct to say that lambda-terms are essentially annotated proofs, the problem is that some proofs can be annotated in more than one way. For instance, the proof
can be annotated as either λx p λy p x or λx p λy p y. [Sorensen and Urzyczyn, 2006, § 4.3] We may add that, further, even a single judgement of the λ-calculus may have more than one proof.
It's up to the reader to complement the proofs and verify that the trees in fact correspond to the written proofs.
What our perspective may offer is that the correspondence is, in fact, bijective, but somehow only between the proofs in both systems. In the case of judgements, multiple ones may hit a particular target.
Future developments
There are several subject we left behind, and gaps we've left to fill. Those can be the object of further developments. We'll discuss them briefly.
Polarity
As you will no doudbtly have noticed, developing all the details of this generalized Curry-Howard Correspondence is a toilsome job. This, among others, was the reason for us to ommit what would be a more complete formulation of propositional logic.
You may have observed, if moved by obsessive curiosity about logical systems, that our formalism does not admit the usual rules for implication.
That's because our propositional logic only admits positive connectives, and the implication is a negative one. That's what's called the polarity of a connective, which defines if the connective is determined by its introduction or elimination rules.
As we've defined them, connectives come with a list of introduction rules and a single elimination rule calculated from the former. Negative connectives work the other way around.
The non-linear conjunction notoriously admits both a positive and a negative definition. The later is most familiar:
in which the last rule is defined from the previous by the mantra "to deduce the connective, it is necessary to provide everything that from it may be taken".
The positive formulation, intead, is
where the second rule comes from the first by the mantra "to conclude something from a connective, we must be able to prove it from every set of hypothesis that might have been used to build it" 10 .
Extending the formalism to admit rules of negative polarity is not hard, but it is laborious. We'd break the definition in two cases. For exemple, the headers wouldn't be simply a vector of adjectives, but indeed a such vector if the connective is positive, and something else otherwise.
Universal formulation
Despite having formalized the Curry-Howard Correspondence, as was our goal, we didn't generalize satisfactorily. The step from a single signature to multiple ones related by (unused) morphisms is only obvious. A more elegant formulation would have to be more universal in flavor.
What would it look like? A candidate is to say that two p-institutions are in "Curry-Howard correspondence" if there is a morphism between them that's bijective in the space of all proofs.
More analysis would be necessary, but right off the bat it seems too wak. Certanly there must be such morphisms that would not deserve, somehow, the name of Curry-Howard.
Another possible aproach is to algorithmically build the λ-calculus from the propositional logic. That would hint us in what way to apply that procedure to more general p-institutions -a sort of "Curry-Howardization". That construction would enojy many properties that, correctly abstracted, would give us something that looks like a universal property.
Other proof systems
Natural deduction is not alone as a manner of building proofs. Indeed, it is less popular than others like Hilbert-style proofs or sequents.
All of this formalisms -we are to believe -form p-institutions if correctly parametrized. If that's the case, what kind of morphisms might be stablished between them? What do they tell us about the relation between those formalisms?
Other constructions
The language of p-institutions (paired with the powerful logic-building tool that are deductive systems) are generic enough to be useful not only in exploring the Curry-Howard Correspondence. There are several procedures logics are subject to that might be analysed.
As an example, consider a tarskian relation ą over J . We define what's called it's paraconsistetization ě. We call a set ∆ Ď J inconsistent if it can deduce any judgement. The paraconsistentization ∆ ě J stands if, and only if, some consistent 11 (not inconsistent) subset ∆ 1 Ď ∆ is such that ∆ 1 ą J. What kind of p-institution construction would that look like? What universal properties would it enjoy?
Furthermore, that's not the only procedure we can come up with. We could think of some sort of "universe addition", like the ones in Martin-Löf's Type Theory, or even something that could go by the name of the "complete interior" of a logic according to a certain semantic.
The point is: a structural exploration of logics is a fruitfull endeavor; and a categorical formulation -minimalist despite expressive -can be a lingua franca in our incursions into this subject.
